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 A B S T R A C T  
This study aims to prove the effect of the company's status, i.e. membership on the 
Islamic capital market and the status as suspect firm, as a determinant of real earnings 
management (REM). REM is conducted by abnormally increasing sales, increasing 
production and reducing discretionary costs in order to achieve a certain earnings 
target. This study uses Earnings Distribution Analysis (EDA) technique, which refers 
to the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to identify the suspect firms. 
Suspect firms are companies that have small positive earnings. The samples of this 
research are companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2011 and 2012. 
Based on the result of regression analysis, hypothesis testing results show that the 
suspect firms conduct real earnings management in all three types of activities more 
aggressively than the non-suspect firms. Furthermore, this study also showed empiri-
cal evidence that there are differences in real earnings management actions between 
companies listed in the Islamic capital market compared to conventional capital mar-
kets. Then, this study also showed that the Islamic capital market is more appropriate 
in response to the REM than the conventional capital market.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membuktikan pengaruh status perusahaan, yaitu 
keanggotaan di pasar modal syariah dan status sebagai perusahaan yang diduga 
melakukan manajemen laba riil (MLR). MLR dilakukan melalui peningkatan penju-
alan, peningkatan produksi dan mengurangi biaya diskresioner untuk mencapai 
sebuah laba tertentu yang ditargetkan. Penelitian ini menggunakan teknik Analisis 
Distribusi Laba, yang mengacu pada Teori Prospek (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) 
melalui identifikasi perusahaan yang diduga melakukan manajemen laba riil. Peru-
sahaan tersebut adalah perusahaan yang memiliki laba positif kecil. Sampel dari 
penelitian ini adalah perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia pada tahun 
2011 dan 2012. Berdasarkan hasil analisis regresi menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan 
terduga melakukan manajemen laba riil melalui ketiga aktivitas riil secara lebih 
agresif daripada perusahaan yang tidak diduga melakukan MLR. Selanjutnya, pene-
litian ini juga menunjukkan bukti empiris bahwa ada perbedaan dalam tindakan 
manajemen laba riil antara perusahaan yang terdaftar di pasar modal syariah di-
bandingkan dengan pasar modal konvensional. Kemudian, penelitian ini juga me-
nunjukkan bukti empiris bahwa pasar modal syariah lebih tepat dalam menanggapi 




Information is important in the capital market, 
especially when it is about earnings. According to 
Penman (2012, p. 220), earnings is one of the 
sources of information for investment decisions. 
The investors use current earnings and informa-
tion in the financial statements to calculate the 
return of their investment. They will make the 
decision to invest only in companies that give rea-
sonable positive return. If this mechanism goes 
well, the capital market will be able to help 
streamline the distribution of wealth, because the 
flow of funds leads to a good company to ensure 
economic growth in order to improve the welfare 
of society. Therefore, earnings become essential 
information in the context of investment, especial-
ly in the capital market. 
Using earnings as one of information for in-
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vestment decision must pass rigorous assess-
ments. The Financial Accounting Standard does 
not limit the selection of accounting policies and 
procedures chosen by the manager to report the 
earnings. Moreover, the process of selecting ac-
counting policies and procedures are complex and 
challenging, not just based on considerations 
about providing high quality information for in-
vestors. Therefore, investors have to analyze the 
earnings quality carefully. 
One important thing for analyzing the quality 
of earnings is the level of the aggressiveness of 
REM because according to Roychowdhury (2006) 
REM reduces earnings quality. Therefore, the in-
vestors should understand that consequence in 
order to get good return. Generally, earnings 
management is an accounting policy choice that is 
used in order to pack earnings to make it look 
attractive. Therefore, investors should have high 
effort to analyze the earnings in order to get a reli-
able assessment of earnings quality. 
The statement is an important argument that 
the market should respond wisely because the 
company's future earnings are not affected by the 
form of earnings but by the essence of the earnings 
information itself. Therefore, in order to obtain 
good information, the market should examine the 
quality of earnings information, including meas-
ures of earnings management. There are arguments 
underlying the study of market response on the 
earnings management. For example, the measure 
reduces the quality of earnings and threatens the 
company’s value. By doing so, the market imposes 
sanctions on companies doing earnings manage-
ment, e.g., they should not buy their shares. 
Recent studies identify one form of earnings 
management based on real activity, not just an 
accrual (accounting) manipulation. In this case, 
Mulford (2002, p. 144) stated that real earnings 
management is the management of real activity 
originating from business decisions that manage-
ment used to improve earnings. Another propo-
nent is Roychouwdhury (2006) who stated that 
such measures have a direct impact on cash flow. 
In addition such measures also have their indirect 
impact on the accrual. 
Real earnings management is new and consi-
dered more secure than earnings management 
based accrual although they have the same big 
risk for companies and investors. This cause real 
earnings management to change the company's 
normal business. Besides that it can affect the val-
uation of the company's performance. Therefore, 
the market should determine the actions of the 
risk in order to get the flow of resources to the 
appropriate qualified companies only and market 
mechanisms to operate efficiently and effectively. 
In relation to the above description, it is still 
limited for the empirical testing on the market 
response to the actions of real earnings manage-
ment. For example, in Brazil Cupertino, Martinez 
& da Costa Jr. 2015) found that the market did not 
understand the risks of such action. This is evi-
denced from the market response that was posi-
tive on companies conducting earnings manage-
ment through sales activities and production. 
Based on the above phenomenon and empiri-
cal findings, this study examines the existence of 
real earnings management in Indonesia capital 
market, followed by the test of differences be-
tween the Islamic capital market and conventional 
capital markets. This research aims to show the 
differences in the quality of corporate earnings in 
both types of capital markets. The study also iden-
tifies the company that conducted real earnings 
management by using techniques Earnings Distri-
bution Analysis (EDA) as the study Roychowd-
hury (2006) and Gunny (2010). The technique re-
fers to the Prospect Theory arguments by Kahne-
man & Tversky (1979). 
The next test is to show the market response 
over the aggressiveness of real earnings 
management on each type of capital markets. 
Those responses were seen through the value of 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) around the 
date of publication of earnings. Purpose of the test 
is to show the level of investors’understanding on 
the quality of earnings. Really, earnings respond-
ed better quality than the earnings that are less 
qualified. 
By assuming the efficient capital markets, this 
research also examines the capital market efficien-
cy in Indonesia. If the market responses to good 
earnings quality, it can be said that the market is 
aware of, understand and respond properly to the 
information so that it can be concluded that the 
Indonesian capital market semicircular strong. 
The evidence is important significance for issuers 
to encourage them to present quality financial 
information. That understanding also implies an 
effort to improve the competency of accountants 
and auditors as the authorities producing financial 
statements. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Real Earnings Management 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), there are 
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three types of real earnings management as inde-
pendent variable such as real earnings manage-
ment through increased sales (MLR sales), in-
creased production (MLR Production), and reduc-
tion of discretionary costs (MLR Cost Discretio-
nary). The value of real earnings management 
through each of these real activities was obtained 
from the difference between their respective real 
activities with the real normal activities. Normal 
activity is calculated by using the model formu-
lated by Roychowdhury (2006) in each group-year 
industry. The following model to calculate each of 
the normal activities: 
a. Normal Sales (NS) 
𝑁𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1  
1
𝐴𝑡−1
 + 𝛽1  
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1




 𝜀𝑡 . (1)   
Where: 
𝑁𝑆𝑡   = operation cash flow in year t 
𝐴𝑡−1 = assets in year t-1 
𝑆𝑡   = sales year t 
𝛥𝑆𝑡  = difference between sales in year t to the 
year t-1 
b. Normal Production (NP) 
𝑁𝑃𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1  
1
𝐴𝑡−1
 + 𝛽1  
𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1







 + 𝜀𝑡 . (2) 
Where: 
𝑁𝑃𝑡  = cost of goods sol + Δ inventories at year t 
𝐴𝑡−1 = assets in year t-1 
𝑆𝑡   = sales year t 
𝛥𝑆𝑡  = difference between year t to the year t-1 
𝛥𝑆𝑡−1 = difference in sales between years t-1 tp 
year t-2 
c. Normal Discretionary Expense (NDE) 
𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
=  𝛼0 +  𝛼1  
1
𝐴𝑡−1
 + 𝛽1  
𝑆𝑡−1
𝐴𝑡−1
 + 𝜀𝑡 . (3)    
Where : 
𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑡  = discretionary expense (research and 
development cost+ advertising cots+ sales cost, 
general, and administrative) in year t 
𝐴𝑡−1 = assets in year t-1 
𝑆𝑡−1  = sales year t-1 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Measurement of CAR as dependent variable in 
this study use abnormal return which is obtained 
from the difference of the stock return with the 
expected return, for 3 days i.e. t-1, t0 and t + 1. The 
calculation of expected return uses a market mod-
el. Related to the calculation of estimated parame-
ters for calculating the expected return, this study 
uses a range of observations around the publica-
tion date of the financial statements, i.e., t-60 and 
t-10. 
This study used two techniques of data analy-
sis, i.e. regression and difference test. Regression 
was used to analyze the influence of the status of 
the company, namely the suspect/non-suspect 
and ICM/non ICM on the level of real earnings 
management. Multiple regression models were 
used to include some control variables, namely the 
size of the company (SIZE), earnings (Net Income) 
and Return on Assets (ROA). Those variables are 
proxy of some of the company's fundamental per-
formance. 
The second analysis technique is a difference 
test used to analyze the CAR differences between 
the two groups of samples based on the level of 
aggression in real earnings management. The di-
vision level of aggressiveness of real earnings 
management is determined based on the ranking 
of the value of each real earnings management 
activities, namely the top 25% (Q1) with 25% in 
the bottom (Q4). The test is also applied to two 
sample groups, namely non ICM and ICM to indi-
cate the market response on real earnings man-
agement in both types of capital markets. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Population and Sample 
The samples consist of companies listed in Indo-
nesia Stock Exchange in 2011 and 2012. They were 
drawn from all kinds of industries except the fi-
nancial and banking industry. In addition, the 
samples were also restricted to companies that 
have a complete financial data, no corporate ac-
tion, active stock data, as well as the financial 
statements are presented in nominal amount. 
Samples were grouped into two, namely a 
representative sample of Islamic Capital Market 
(ICM) and a representative sample of the Conven-
tional Capital Market (CCM). Samples of ICM 
represented by issuers included in the List of Is-
lamic Securities (LIS), while samples of CCM are 
issuers that are not included in DES. Samples were 
also differentiated between companies suspected 
of doing real earnings management (suspect) who 
do not. The determination of the suspect compa-
nies was based on the ratio of earnings per asset 
beginning of the year, which is between 0 and 
0,005 as research Roychouwdhury (2006). 
This study uses secondary data such as finan-
cial data and stock data. They were obtained from 
the Financial Statements, Indonesia Stock Exchange 
database, www.yahoo.finance.com, and Osiris. 
 
Research Variables 
The variables of this research are: 
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1. Real Earnings Management 
2. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Measurement of CAR as dependent variable 
in this study use abnormal return which is obtained 
from the difference of the stock return with the 
expected return, for 3 days i.e. t-1, t0 and t + 1. The 
calculation of expected return uses a market model. 
Related to the calculation of estimated parameters 
for calculating the expected return, this study uses 
a range of observations around the publication 
date of the financial statements, i.e. t-60 and t-10. 
 
Techniques of Data Analysis 
This study used two techniques of data analysis, 
i.e. regression and difference test. Regression was 
used to analyze the influence of the status of the 
company, namely the suspect/non-suspect and 
ICM/non ICM on the level of real earnings man-
agement. Multiple regression models were used to 
include some control variables, namely the size of 
the company (SIZE), earnings (Net Income) and 
Return on Assets (ROA). Those variables are 
proxy of some of the company's fundamental per-
formance. 
The second analysis technique is a difference 
test used to analyze the CAR differences between 
the two groups of samples based on the level of 
aggression in real earnings management. The di-
vision level of aggressiveness of real earnings 
management is determined based on the ranking 
of the value of each real earnings management 
activities, namely the top 25% (Q1) with 25% in 
the bottom (Q4). The test is also applied to two 
sample groups, namely non ICM and ICM to indi-
cate the market response on real earnings man-
agement in both types of capital markets. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on observations of companies listed on the 
Stock Exchange in 2011 and 2012, there are 878 
firm-years identified as initial observation. Those 
observation are divided into 510 firm-years (58%) 
included in ICM DES and 368 firm-years (42%) 
that are not included in the ICM. Furthermore, 
there are 449 firm-years observation that has com-
plete data to calculate variables of the study, with 
the composition of the company 313 firm-years 
(69.71%) including ICM and 136 firm-years 
(30.29%) that are not included in the ICM. The 
amount as shown in Table 1 is spread on the entire 
industry, in which the largest portion is on Trade 
in Services and Investment industry, as 26%. 
The statistic description of the two groups of 
samples based on the variables presented in Ta-
Table 1 
Samples Description 
Industries ICM Non ICM Total 
Agriculture 17 7 24 
Mining 26 11 37 
Basic Industry and Chemicals 50 23 73 
Various Industries 26 17 43 
Consumer Goods Industry 33 9 42 
Property Real Estate and Construction 55 11 66 
Utilities and Transportation Infrastructure 22 25 47 
Trade in Services and Investment 84 33 117 




Variables (Mean) ICM Non ICM t Stat Total Samples 
CAR -0.004 0.009 -31.253 0.000 
MLR Sales 0.018 -0.016 -12.788 0.008 
MLR Production -0.145 0.763 -7.487 0.130 
MLR Cost Discretionary 0.015 -0.029 -10.521 0.001 
Size 4.125 4.131 90.652 4.127 
NI 0.025 -0.056 -11.253 0.000 
ROA 0.006 -0.012 -13.204 0.000 
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ble 2. The table shows the average value. In gener-
al, both groups of samples are significantly differ-
ent at α level of 5%. General financial performance 
of each sample group appears on the SIZE varia-
ble, NI, and ROA. Company size (SIZE) of ICM 
group is smaller than the non-ICM group. How-
ever, earnings performance (NI) and profitability 
(ROA) of ICM group is better than the non-ICM 
group. 
An overview of the market response (CAR) in 
each group showed that the market responded 
negatively on the earnings information in the ICM 
group, otherwise the market response to the earn-
ings information non ICM group is positive. Based 
on the positive accounting theory, this fact shows 
preliminary evidence that there are differences in 
response to market on the earnings information in 
both types of markets, which, of course requires 
further explanation. Based on these facts, there is 
prediction that the market also uses the status of 
the company as important information in making 
investment decisions. 
Table 2 also presents a description of the level 
of aggressiveness in real earnings management. In 
general, there are differences in the level of ag-
gressiveness of real earnings management in each 
sample group, both for MLR in Sales, MLR in Pro-
duction, or MLR in Discretionary Expense. This is 
shown from the average value of three of the op-
posite sign. The table shows that the ICM group 
did MLR in Sales and MLR in Discretionary Ex-
pense more aggressive than non-ICM group. The 
opposite occurs in MLR in Production. 
In general, the level of aggressiveness in real 
earnings management in the ICM group was 
higher than non-ICM group. This empirical find-
ing becomes one of the important arguments con-
cerning the finding that the CAR in the ICM group 
is negative. It means that the market understands 
that the companies included in the ICM conduct 
real earnings management aggressively and they 
are punished by the market in the form of a nega-
tive CAR. In contrast, markets reward companies 
to the non-ICM (in the form of positive CAR) on 
actions did not do real earnings management ag-
gressively. 
This research identifies the companies that 
were alleged to do real earnings management 
(suspect-firm) through EDA techniques (Roy-
chouwdhury 2006; Gunny 2010; Aflatooni & Mo-
karomi 2013; and Chen, Lin & Weng 2013). Firms 
that suspected of real earnings management re-
ported positive earnings despite the small value. 
Some of these studies showed that suspect-firm 
conducted real earnings management (Roy-
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EDA technique is applied only on samples 
that have a ratio of net earnings per total assets at 
the beginning of the year in interval -0.075 to 
+0.075. The restrictions are intended to focus on 
companies around in the critical point, i.e 0.000 
which is the boundary between profit and loss. 
There are 229 firm-years (51% of the sample) who 
complete these criteria. Furthermore, the EDA 
samples were divided into 30 groups, where each 
group had intervals of 0.005, which is ordered 
from -0.075 to +0.075. In order to get a graphic 
illustration of the EDA, the group calculated each 
frequency. The EDA is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 shows the EDA illustration depicting 
the frequency distribution of earnings which is not 
normal. The figure shows a drastic increase in the 
frequency of group 15 (for 6 firm-years) to a group 
of 16 (as many as 20 firm-years). Group 15 is a 
sample group had total assets ratio of earnings per 
year at the beginning in the interval -0.005 to 
0.000, while the group of 16 has the interval 0.000 
to 0.005. Similarly, it was also found in the results 
of observations by Burgstahler & Dichev (1997), 
Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010), Aflatooni & 
Mokaromi (2013), Chen, Lin & Weng (2013), and 
Yuliana, Alim & Anshori (2015). 
The explanation of the phenomenon is re-
ferred to Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky 
1979) due to the behavior of managers to manage 
earnings in order to push company earnings at a 
positive value or not showing a loss. Such actions 
are also consistent with the view that earnings 
management is a function of anxiety (Albrecht, 
Stice & Stice 2008, p. 198). One of the triggers for 
anxiety is when company earnings are at a loss, 
although its value is small. If the manager of the 
company reported a loss as it is, then the manager 
faces the problems related to a possible reduction 
in the company's stock price, the possibility of a 
penalty of creditors/suppliers, may not get a bo-
nus, and other bad consequences. The manager of 
course avoids it, especially if the loss is small val-
ue. One attempt to turn a small loss into positive 
earnings despite the small value can be done 
through a subtle way that is earnings management 
(Penman 2010, p. 608). 
In the above condition, the company's man-
agers have a strong motivation to improve earn-
ings from being negative, although its value is 
small. They did it by doing real earnings man-
agement. Mulford (2002, p. 144) stated that real 
earnings management is the management of real 
activity originating from management business 
decisions that used to improve earnings. The real 
activities to improve earnings include increased 
sales, increased production, and the reduced dis-
cretionary costs which conduct in the levels ex-
ceed the normal business of the company (Roy-
chowdhury 2006). 
Mulford (2002, p. 72) called evidence of earn-
ings management techniques of EDA as evidence 
in academic research side. One way to establish 
the occurrence of earnings management according 
to an academic approach is through detecting a 
Table 3 
The Results of Regression Test 
 
MLR Sales MLR Production MLR Discretionary Expense 
Intercept -0.158*** 7.683*** 0.181*** 
Suspect -0.037 -0.535 -0.073*** 
ICM 0.029*** -1.007 0.032*** 
SIZE 0.035*** -1.654*** -0.048*** 
NI 0.025 1.389 0.152*** 
ROA 0.153*** -1.224 -0.032 
F 5.956 3.312 15.277 
Adj R Square 5.24% 2.51% 13.74% 
*; **; and ***, significant at α 10%; 5%; and 1%. 
 
Table 4 
Different Test Results: CAR 
 
Q1 Q4 t Stat Entire Samples 
MLR Sales 0.007 -0.011 -14.399 -0.001 
MLR Production 0.018 0.003 -13.951 0.011 
MLR Discretionary Expense 0.008 0.010 -14.137 0.009 
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straight increase in the frequency of reporting 
small positive earnings. On the other hand, it was 
found rarely the frequency of reporting small neg-
ative earnings. Based on these findings, the com-
panies that are in a group of 16 allegedly real 
earnings management (suspect), whose evidence 
requires further analysis as part of further discus-
sion. 
This section describes the findings about the 
determinants of the real earnings management 
which are derived from the status of the company, 
namely suspect/non suspect and ICM/non ICM. 
Based on the identification of suspect-firm using 
EDA techniques, it is necessary to prove that the 
firm is conducting in real earnings management. 
Regression test results as shown in Table 3 indi-
cate that the suspect-firm significantly perform 
real earnings management through reduction of 
discretionary expense, while the two other real 
earnings management activity is not the case. Re-
gression coefficients for Suspect variables in the 
equation of real earnings management through 
reduction of discretionary expense, showed a neg-
ative value (-0.073). The meaning of these values is 
that the suspect-firms have a tendency to do real 
earnings management through reduction of dis-
cretionary expense more aggressively than the 
non suspect-firms 
Empirical evidence shows that the use of 
Prospect Theory to explain the motivation of real 
earnings management is only valid on the condi-
tion of MLR through reducing discretionary ex-
pense, while the other two types MLR (sales and 
production) requires further explanation. There-
fore, this study includes the company's status as a 
member of ICM as a determinant of the real earn-
ings management. 
Regression test results showed further evi-
dence regarding the effects of the status of com-
panies included in the ICM to the aggressiveness 
of real earnings management. It also shows that 
ICM variable is in a positive significance in the 
regression where the dependent variable is Sales 
MLR and MLR Discretionary fee. In the test re-
sults in which the MLR sales as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient of ICM is positive signifi-
cant indicates that the ICM group are more ag-
gressive in conducting real earnings management 
than non-ICM firms. Furthermore, empirical evi-
dence also shows that the coefficient of ICM in 
the regression test of MLR Cost Discretionary 
show a positive and significant value as well. It 
implies that the ICM group did MLR Discretio-
nary expense more conservatively than non-ICM 
group. 
The coefficients have opposite signs with 
Suspect coefficient, meaning that the behavior of 
the two groups differ in conducting MLR Discre-
tionary expense. In addition, the company's status 
as a member of the Islamic capital market becomes 
one of relatively strong argument in explaining 
the variation in real earnings management. There-
fore, this study complements the use phenomenon 
of Prospect Theory in real earnings management. 
This section identifies the results in real earn-
ings management. The real earnings management 
is affected by the status of the company, whether 
suspect/non Suspect and ICM/non ICM, this 
study examines the level of investor awareness of 
the risks in the real earnings management actions. 
Before testing the market response to the actions 
of real earnings management in each status, it first 
has served the market response to the overall ac-
tions of real earnings management, as shown in 
Table 4. It shows the results of different test mar-
ket response, which is measured by CAR. 
The samples are distinguished by the level of 
aggression in real earnings management con-
ducted. Q1 group is a group of companies that 
conduct real earnings management aggressively. 
Table 5 
CAR Difference Test Results: ICM and non ICM 
 
Q1 Q4 t Test 
ICM: 
   MLR Sales -0.001 -0.002 -2.267*** 
MLR Production 0.000 0.025 2.185*** 
MLR Discretionery Exp. 0.002 0.003 -1.690*** 
Non ICM:    
MLR Sales 0.065 -0.011 1.158 
MLR Production 0.060 -0.012 -0.706 
MLR Discretionery Exp. -0.016 0.056 2.107*** 
*; **; and ***, significant at α 10%; 5%; and 1%. 
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The group was 25% (112 firm-years) top ranks. 
Instead, Q4 was 25% firm-years which are at the 
lowest rank. Thus, both have different levels of 
aggressiveness in real earnings management. 
Table 4 shows that there are significant CAR 
differences between the groups of Q1 to Q4 in all 
of real earnings management activities. However, 
these differences have a different interpretation 
when it is associated with the understanding that 
real earnings management reduces the quality of 
earnings. According to this understanding, the 
CAR in Q1 group should be lower than the Q4 
groups. 
Empirical evidence shows that this only ap-
plies to the CAR different test results on samples 
of MLR Discretionary fee. It means, that the mar-
ket understands the risks arising from the MLR 
discretionary expense. Table 4 shows the average 
of CAR in the group Q1 is lower than the group 
Q4, with a significant difference. These results are 
consistent with previous regression test results 
which prove that the cause of the MLR Discretio-
nary expense is an opportunist action by manager 
that turn a negative earnings into a positive earn-
ings (see Table 3). Thus, these findings are consis-
tent with Capital Market Hypothesis and Positive 
Accounting Theory. 
In different tests on Sales MLR and Produc-
tion MLR, the empirical facts show precisely the 
opposite result. CAR in Q1 group is higher than 
the CAR in Q4 group. The findings are also consis-
tent with previous findings that show empirical 
evidence that in the Indonesian capital market, 
Sales MLR and Production MLR were not affected 
by the company's status as a suspect/non suspect 
that the assertion that real earnings management 
reduce earnings quality unsupported empirical 
evidence. Based on these facts, it is natural for the 
market to respond MLR Sales and Production 
MLR as things that are not bearing risk and do not 
deserve the penalty of the market. 
Especially for testing on samples of MLR 
Sales, it shows interesting results. CAR with dif-
ferent test results shows that the CAR in compa-
nies that conduct sales MLR aggressive is positive 
and well above the average of the entire sample. 
The significance of these findings is that the mar-
ket actually appreciates the Sales MLR action. The 
findings are consistent with empirical facts on the 
previous regression test that Sales MLR is not af-
fected by opportunistic behavior of managers (as 
evidenced from Suspect variables were not signifi-
cant), but it is conducted by a group of companies 
included in the DES. Thus, the market considers 
that the Sales MLR is a business strategy that 
should be appreciated and its practice applied in 
companies with sharia label. 
This conclusion is supported by the results of 
different test CAR on each sample group which is 
distinguished by their status, ICM and non ICM, 
as shown in Table 5. The results of the different 
tests show that in general, ICM respons differently 
three activity MLR based on the aggresiveness, 
while the conventional capital market is only able 
to distinguish aggressiveness of MLR Discretio-
nary expense only. 
Table 5 shows that in the Islamic capital mar-
ket, the average of CAR in the sample MLR ag-
gressive selling (Q1) is higher as compared to the 
samples with levels that are not MLR of aggres-
sive sales (Q4). The same was found in samples of 
non ICM although the differences were not signif-
icant. The empirical fact is in line with previous 
findings, namely that the market responded posi-
tively to the MLR Sales. Thus, these findings rein-
force the conclusion that, with the assumption of 
efficient capital markets and the positive account-
ing theory, MLR Sales does not reduce the quality 
of earnings because the market actually appre-
ciates the action. 
Further empirical evidence is that the Islamic 
capital market gives sanction on MLR Production 
which is shown the value of CAR in Q1 (0.000) 
lower than the CAR in Q4 (0.025), with significant 
differences. The evidence shows that the Islamic 
capital markets understand that the MLR produc-
tion is somethings that pose a risk it feasible to get 
a penalty. The fact is different with different test 
results on samples using non-ICM firms, because 
it turns the conventional capital market did not 
prove any CAR differences between sample Q1 to 
Q4. 
The empirical evidence of market response on 
MLR of Discretionary Expense shows solid evi-
dence that it reduces the quality of earnings, both 
in Islamic and conventional capital markets. This 
is supported by the CAR in the group Q1 lower 
and significantly different from the CAR in Q4 
group. From the three types of MLR, MLR of Dis-
cretionary Expenses, consistently, show empirical 
evidence that supports the conclusion. It is stated 
that the real earnings management reduces the 
quality of earnings. This finding is consistent with 
the findings of Cupertino, Martinez & da Costa Jr. 
(2015) which showed empirical evidence that in 
Brazil, the market responds correctly only real 
earnings management actions on MLR Discretio-
nary fee. 
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5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
It is evident that empirically this study shows dif-
ferent evidence. First, for the three real earnings 
management activities, only real earnings man-
agement through reduction of discretionary ex-
pense is supported empirically that it reduces the 
quality of earnings and market appropriately re-
sponse to such actions. It is also empirically clear 
that real earnings management through increased 
sales is precisely the opposite of the theory that 
real earnings management reduces earnings quali-
ty. 
Second, this study shows that real earnings 
management through increased sales actually 
made by companies that are the members of the 
Sharia capital market and they gain their market 
appreciation. However, the real earnings 
management is the company strategy to increase 
the value of campany. Then, real earning 
management through increasing products shows 
the evidence which is less sturdily to reduce real 
earnings management. Yet, in general, the market 
failed to response to the exact risk. 
In general, this finding can contribute to 
identifying the performance of real earnings 
management and the impact to the earnings 
quality. This study also shows the empirical 
evident about the market response on the 
performance of real earnings management. Then, 
this study shows the empirical evidences that the 
status of the company as the member of Sharia 
Capital Market becomes one of the strong 
determinant of real earnings management. Sharia 
Capital Market also provides a response more 
precise on the performance of earnings 
management. 
This research gives opportunities for further 
research, among others, to test the efficiency of the 
capital market in Indonesia by a way to include 
some other variables that proved to be a sturdy 
become the determinant of market response. Thus, 
it can widen the conclusion from this study by 
reexamining more companies. In addition, in 
relation to the finding, it is obvious that real 
earnings management does not strongly reduce 
the quality of earnings. Finally, further studies can 
conduct research on the determinants of real 
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